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THE US COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROCESS: A RELATIONAL 
SIGNALLING PERSPECTIVE 
 





Cooperative compliance programmes have been introduced in various tax jurisdictions, with 
its pioneers including Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Such 
programmes are part of a wider trend in regulatory systems that emerged in the 1980s, and 
attempt to better balance interests between the tax authority and corporate taxpayers, and seek 
to reflect a more collaborative working method, as promoted by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). This paper examines the US cooperative compliance 
arrangement, known as the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP), and probes the nature of the 
relationship that ensues between the regulator and regulatee under CAP, the motivations of 
each party to the arrangement, and the manner in which the relationship is (or is not) sustained. 
This paper sheds light on such matters pertaining to CAP by examining its evolution and 
operation through the lens of regulation theory, drawing in particular on the work of Etienne 
(2013), who develops a typology of ideal type interactions and relational signals in regulatory 
settings. It is also informed by interview data from two separate studies involving interviews 
with senior in-house tax executives/advisors. Drawing on Etienne’s typology facilitates a better 
understanding of the limits of cooperative compliance in the context of large businesses, 
particularly in the US environment. This paper shows the importance of adequately capturing 
the motivations of regulator and regulatee, demonstrating they do not carry equal weight nor 
have they remained stable over time, and addresses the implications of these differences for 
the success of an initiative such as CAP. It also demonstrates that interactions between 
regulator and regulatee follow multiple logics, and highlights and critiques the high level of 
interaction required, especially during the initial stage of responsive regulation-based 
relationships. The paper concludes with some broader considerations around regulator-
regulatee relationships, including the potential role for recent technological innovations in this 
context. 
 






Together with some other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, including Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK, the US can be 
seen as a pioneer in reconfiguring regulatory relationships in the field of corporate taxation into 
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one that better balances interests between the tax authority and corporate taxpayers. Whereas 
the relationship between tax administrations and taxpayers has traditionally been strongly 
characterised by power asymmetry, cooperative compliance programmes aim to realise a more 
cooperative relationship, in which compliance should be enhanced by mechanisms other than 
strict control-and-punishment. Often in parallel with trends across other parts of the public 
sector, such as New Public Management (NPM) type modernisations, tax administrations have 
started to introduce enforcement mechanisms that are more responsive to specific profiles of 
corporate taxpayers, with the expectation that this would generate efficiencies and other 
benefits for both tax administrations and corporate taxpayers.  
 
In relation to corporate tax administration, the more collaborative working method,  strongly 
promoted by the OECD and initially referred to as the “enhanced relationship” model (OECD, 
2008), was renamed and rebranded “cooperative compliance” in 2013 (OECD, 2013). This 
paper examines one particular form of cooperative compliance arrangement, namely the 
Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) programme in operation in the US. This programme 
was introduced in 2003 and differs from similar programmes in other countries by being both 
voluntary and prescriptive. CAP carves out a particular segment of the taxpaying population – 
large corporate taxpayers – and creates a distinctive form of regulatory interaction with that 
group. While the structure and history of CAP is reasonably well understood by practitioners 
and others with knowledge of tax regulation processes, little research has attempted to probe 
the nature of the relationship that ensues between the regulator and regulatee under CAP, the 
motivations of each party to the arrangement, and the manner in which the relationship is (or 
is not) sustained. This paper sheds light on such matters pertaining to CAP by examining its 
evolution and operation through the lens of regulation theory, drawing in particular on the work 
of Etienne (2013), who develops a typology of ideal type interactions and relational signals in 
regulatory settings. It is also informed by interview data from two separate studies involving 
interviews with senior in-house tax executives/advisors. By using Etienne’s typology to probe 
the operation of CAP, we are able to better understand the limits of cooperative compliance in 
the context of large businesses, particularly in the US environment.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the broader field of responsive 
regulation and describe Etienne’s framework as a basis for evaluating the CAP programme. 
This is followed by a brief history and description of CAP, before we analyse its operation by 
reference to Etienne’s model and draw some conclusions about the differences in motivational 
drivers between regulator and regulatees, and the implications of these differences for the 
success of an initiative such as CAP.  
 
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS 
 
The area of tax administration has turned out to be one of the most fruitful areas for the practical 
application of “responsive regulation”. Ayres and Braithwaite set out their regulatory view 
most comprehensively in their foundational work “Responsive Regulation” (1992). This work 
provides a “third alternative” (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 3) to both the free market and 
government regulation, and attracted instant interest from practitioners in regulatory bodies. 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s “Responsive Regulation” (1992) and the substantial amount of 
subsequent elaborations, however, dedicate limited attention to the underlying motivations of 
regulators and regulatees throughout their interactions. Scholarship outside the area of 
responsive regulation demonstrates that motivational factors are critical in order to explain the 
evolution of relationships between actors (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Lindenberg, 2001). 
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This article identifies major differences in motivational drivers between regulator and 
regulatees. Arguably, an underestimation of these motivational differences accounts for many 
of the difficulties occurring in, for example,  the Dutch cooperative compliance programme 
titled Horizontal Monitoring (De Widt, 2017), and it is instructive to consider the CAP 
programme from this perspective. To identify the relevance of different motivational factors, 
we draw upon a framework developed by Etienne (2013), which is described in more detail 
below. A major strength of Etienne’s framework compared to other frameworks is that it does 
not take a preferred view of either side in the regulatory relationship, but can be equally applied 
to map regulatory relationships from the perspectives of the regulator and regulatee. 
 
The rise of cooperative compliance programmes in tax administrations is part of a wider trend 
in regulatory systems that emerged in the 1980s. Incentivised by both increasing pressures on 
regulatory resources and a wish to make the public sector more service-oriented, regulatory 
systems developed, adopting a more responsive approach towards those being regulated. Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992) provided a ground-breaking conceptualisation of the phenomenon. In 
J. Braithwaite's (2006) own words, “[t]he basic idea of responsive regulation is that 
governments should be responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding 
whether a more or less interventionist response is needed” (p. 886). Hence, a gradual 
sanctioning regime, referred to as the “enforcement pyramid”, should enable regulators to make 
more effective use of their resources and bring regulation more in line with regulatees’ risk 
profiles. Regulatees with low-risk profiles would be subjected to less scrutiny and would enjoy 
a reduction of administrative burdens (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Lodge, 2015).  
 
Another critical feature of responsive regulation is that regulation is deemed to be more 
effective if regulated parties do not know exactly what to expect from the regulator. Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) refer to this as the “benign big gun”, indicating that, whilst going up in the 
enforcement pyramid, regulators “bluff” greater power than they actually possess. The 
uncertainty this subsequently generates amongst regulatees regarding the severity of sanctions 
that might be imposed upon them is expected to improve regulatees’ rule compliance. The idea 
of responsive regulation has found widespread popularity in tax administrations. A pioneering 
role was fulfilled by the Australian Tax Office (ATO), which introduced the ATO Compliance 
Model in 1998 (Murphy, 2004).  
 
While many public administrations put effort into developing a more responsive regulatory 
style, responsive regulation has faced several criticisms. First, the model has been criticised for 
being too state-focussed, which may have resulted in inadequate awareness amongst regulators 
of the mindsets of regulatees, including the manner in which the institutional environment and 
performance of the regulatory regime affects regulatees’ behaviour (Black & Baldwin, 2010). 
Second, the model pays limited attention to the implementation of responsive regulation, not 
addressing questions such as what the administrative prerequisites for both regulator and 
regulatee are and how they are meeting them. Third, responsive regulation has been criticised, 
on more principled grounds, for providing a regulatory model that would go against generality 
and equality of rule enforcement (Westerman, 2013). These criticisms also apply to the 
implementation of responsive regulation by tax administrations. In most responsive regulation-
based tax monitoring approaches, including cooperative compliance programmes, the 
dominant perspective of researchers is that of the regulator, i.e. the tax administration. The 
recent substantial stream of research which takes a behavioural perspective in order to explain 
tax compliance concentrates almost exclusively on the tax compliance of individuals (e.g. 
Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008). Hence, we know little about the behavioural factors that 
underlie interactions between corporate taxpayers and tax administrations.  
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It can be assumed that motivational factors play an important role in regulatory interactions, 
even more so when regulatees are free to join a regulatory arrangement, such as a cooperative 
compliance programme, like the CAP in the US. However, most research on the relationship 
between motivations and rule compliance by businesses has been conducted outside the domain 
of tax. For example, substantial research has been done on motivations underlying 
environmental behaviour, e.g. for farming (Atari, Yiridoe, Smale, & Duinker, 2009). The 
literature on environmental regulation suggests three motivations underlying rule compliance. 
First, rule compliance may follow from the regulatee’s expectation of being detected and the 
likelihood of receiving a fine when demonstrating noncompliant behaviour (Becker, 1968). 
Second, rule compliance may have a social background and be sustained by shared norms 
combined with the desire to earn the approval and respect of significant others (Levi, 1988). 
Finally, rule compliance will be influenced by a regulatee’s ability to comply (Winter & May, 
2001).  
 
The translation of motivational factors into practical behaviour has been referred to as 
“motivational postures”; or styles of engagement through which regulatees give meaning to the 
regulator’s message (V. Braithwaite, 2009, p. 20). Hence, motivational postures exhibit the 
extent to which a regulatee “accepts the agenda of the regulator, in principle, and endorses the 
way in which the regulator functions and carries out duties on a daily basis” (Braithwaite, 
Murphy, & Reinhart, 2007, p. 138). Due to this, trust and respect between the regulator and 
regulatee, and the degree of agreement they share regarding the ends and means of regulation, 
are fundamental for achieving rule compliance.  
 
A major limitation of motivational frameworks is that they strongly reason from the perspective 
of either the regulator or regulatee. For example, in the case of risk-based regulation, Power’s 
(2004) work focusses on the regulatees, whereas Black (2005, 2006) and Rothstein, Huber, and 
Gaskell (2006) take the perspective of the regulator. Due to this, motivational theories not only 
miss out the regulator’s or regulatee’s perspective, but are also rather static, lacking analytical 
concepts by which to analyse how the interactions between regulator and regulatee affect each 
party’s regulatory stance. Etienne (2013), however, provides a framework that puts equal 
emphasis on the regulator and regulatee, and incorporates the impact of relationship dynamics. 
Etienne (2013) takes a relational signalling approach to these interactions. The idea of 
relational signals is derived from Lindenberg (2000); they comprise information exchanged in 
repeated interactions that may be either positive or negative, and serve to allow each party in 
the relationship to infer the other’s interest, “making certain behaviours meaningful and others 
less so’” (Etienne, 2013, p.35). Etienne observes that regulatory relationships are imbued with 
ambiguity requiring sensemaking on the part of both regulators and regulatees. He develops a 
model of ideal types that distinguishes between five different motivations, dynamics or rules 
of interaction that focus on “which rules of interaction might hold sway in stable, ongoing 
regulator-regulatee relationships” (Etienne, 2013, p. 36). The five ideal types are as follows: 
 
• Self-interest: Relationships of self-interest are built around a shared focus on resources, 
or gains and cost. In a self-interested relationship, the respective positions of regulator 
and regulatee are determined by “how resourceful they are and by their ability to put 
these resources to effective use” (Etienne, 2013, p. 37). Self-interest as a motivation for 
engagement may not be stable and a relationship built upon this alone may need 
“continual renegotiation of expectations”. Self-interest relationships also tend to 
discount other motives, for example, “[c]alls to public interest or moral values [which] 
are considered hypocritical”. 
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• Legality: In the case of legality, regulator-regulatee relationships are strongly 
determined by legal rules, which both the regulator and regulatee are expected to 
follow. Interactions are built on status, with regulator and regulatee in the positions of 
superior and inferior respectively. Relationships grounded in legality generally tend to 
be stable over time, given that it is the legal nature that prompts compliance rather than 
the content of specific rules. 
 
• Authority: Authority relationships are built on status and, like legality relationships, 
ostensibly put regulator and regulatee in positions of superior and inferior respectively 
(Etienne, 2013, p. 37). As Lukes (1990, p. 214), quoted by Etienne (2013) states, 
authority is “a command reason that reduces the significance of other reasons that 
would otherwise prevail, and removes the point of weighing them”. A relationship 
sustained by authority addresses unwritten rules and facilitates unquestioned obedience. 
 
• Judgement: Another sustaining factor of regulator-regulatee relationships is judgement, 
in which case the relationship is determined by morality or science, and considerations 
of truth or right dominate (Etienne, 2013). Values are a critical element of judgment 
relationships. Here, cooperation is focussed on the content of what each party is 
expected to do, with disagreements capable of settlement through reasoned 
argumentation.  
 
• Solidarity: Solidarity relationships are horizontal relationships based upon trust, in 
which “neither party can dictate to the others what she must do” (Granovetter, 2002, p. 
40). The elements relevant to solidarity relationships display many similarities with 
judgement relationships, but solidarity relationships are entirely based upon trust, itself 
emerging from repeated positive interactions (Blau, 1986). 
 
Having identified five types of motivation for regulatory relationships, Etienne then outlines 
several hypothetical relational signals derived from empirical literature and theory, observing 
that these signals are context-dependent in terms of the manner and timing of presentation and 
expectations of reciprocity. The relational signals identified by Etienne are as follows (with 
several collapsed for the purpose of this paper): 
 
• Regulatory relief: the regulator provides relief from regulatory requirements. 
• Favours: may take the form of gifts, or bribery. 
• Formalism: formalising the nature of the relationship through, for example, contracts 
and other documentation which constrains behaviour. 
• Third-party involvement: regulatory relationships are dyadic, but it is possible to 
introduce a third party for a variety of purposes. 
• Monitoring: implies surveillance, which may be routine or exceptional. 
• Argumentation and bargaining: as forms of dispute resolution. 
• Threats and sanctions: most commonly imposed by the regulator. 
• Claims of authority: again, most commonly imposed by the regulator. 
  
As noted earlier, rather than taking the perspective of either party, Etienne’s ideal types allow 
us to consider “which rules of interaction might hold sway in stable, ongoing regulator-
regulatee relationships” (Etienne, 2013, p. 36). Depending upon their behaviour, actors can 
either support or undermine these relationships by sending positive or negative relational 
signals. Whether the signals are perceived as positive or negative depends on the underlying 
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relationship type. For example, a formalistic approach would strengthen a regulator-regulatee 
relationship that is focussed on legality, whereas the exchange of gifts would undermine this 
relationship. While Etienne does not provide an empirical application of the framework, it is 
to be expected that, in practice, we will more likely find blurred rather than pure versions of 
the ideal types. In this article, Etienne’s framework, alongside other insights deriving from 
responsive regulation theory, is used to analyse the extent to which relationship features do 
account for the evolution and operation of CAP. Before analysing CAP, the following section 
briefly describes CAP and outlines its perceived costs and benefits. Its legal aspects constitute 
one of the main controversies over cooperative compliance arrangements in the tax arena. The 
discussion on this concentrates on the model’s proposed differentiated approach towards 
regulatees, which would be at odds with basic assumptions about the generality and equal 
application of rules (cf. Westerman, 2013).  
 
THE COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROCESS (CAP) PROGRAMME 
 
Introduction of US CAP 
 
CAP constitutes the primary cooperative compliance initiative introduced by the US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), with other initiatives, including Limited Issue Focused Examination 
(LIFE) and Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs). CAP was introduced in December 2005 in 
the IRS’s Large and Mid-Size Business Division (LMSB) which serves corporations and 
partnerships with assets greater than $10 million. The Large Business and International (LB&I) 
Division of the IRS was established as a new division in the IRS in 2010, superseding LMSB.5 
CAP started as a pilot programme with 17 voluntary participators.6  CAP superseded a previous 
programme, the “Pre Filing Agreement Program” (PFA), which had operated since 2000 for 
large taxpayers and allowed for negotiation of specific issues not yet disclosed in a tax return. 
CAP is consistent with responsive regulation theory, as noted by Osofsky (2012), “a shift away 
from an adversarial approach towards cooperative compliance partnerships’, who also observes 
that the “list of CAP users is becoming a veritable who’s who of major corporations” (p.122-
123). 
 
The US tax system of filing returns and paying taxes relies heavily on self-assessment, and 
filing of tax returns can be followed by auditing by the IRS. Holmes (2011) suggests that the 
IRS is significantly outgunned by large multinationals in particular, observing “[o]ften 
understaffed and outwitted, IRS agents have resorted to using every penalty, sanction, 
procedural tactic, threat and common law doctrine available in their arsenal to capture the 
elusive [large business entity] income base for the US Treasury chest” (p.1417-1418). Noting 
the high monetary stakes, Holmes (2011) further characterises the engagement between the 
IRS and large entities as a game that has developed considerable mistrust and resentment over 
a long period of time.  
 
A major driver for the implementation of CAP was the increasingly time-consuming process 
between filing and the closing of a company’s tax position for an accounting period, which was 
perceived as unacceptable both from the perspective of business and government. The 
Commissioner of the IRS in 2003, Mark Everson, stated that it took the IRS five years to 
complete an audit of a corporate tax return, which drained IRS resources and capacity 
                                                 
5 https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-realigns-and-renames-large-business-division-enhances-focus-on-international-tax-
administration. For background to the US large corporate environment and, in particular, the role of in-house tax 
executives, see Mulligan and Oats (2015). 
6 https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/compliance-assurance-process; accessed January 2017. 
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(Bronzewska, 2016). In an attempt to reduce this time, the IRS expanded the PFA process to 
accelerate corporate income tax audits. As Opper (2011) observes: 
 
The PFA process was designed to resolve the tax treatment of a specific item before 
the filing of the tax return in which the tax treatment of the item appeared. If the 
IRS agreed with a taxpayer’s PFA request, the IRS engaged in fact-finding for the 
item. The taxpayer and the IRS then sought to agree on the return position for the 
item. If the IRS and taxpayer agreed, and if the taxpayer reported the position in 
accordance with the agreement, the issue was spared any post-filing review. The 
taxpayer thus was certain about the tax treatment of the item.  
 
The then IRS Chief Counsel, Donald Korb, asserted the “ultimate pre-filing agreement” would 
exist if the pre-filing concept could be applied to all material tax items occurring during a 
taxable year. From 2003 onwards, the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) programme was 
developed as a test of Korb’s concept. The LMSB undertook a comprehensive business process 
review, seeking advice from external stakeholder groups which established guidelines for 
encouraging collaboration and minimising taxpayer burdens with a single point of contact in 
the IRS (Nolan, 2006). CAP was then introduced in 2005 on a pilot basis. Corporates could 
join the CAP pilot on a voluntary basis, following invitation from the IRS. According to Nolan, 
then Commissioner of the IRS Large and Mid-Size Business Division, the CAP approach 
leveraged the then new corporate governance and reporting requirements imposed by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Nolan, 2006). She explained the motivation for the introduction 
of CAP as originating in the lengthy delays associated with post-filing examinations in which 
“taxpayers often have to sift through years of old financial and tax records in an effort to 
provide the requested information or to reconstruct the circumstances leading up to particular 
business decisions and transactions” (Nolan, 2006, p. 26). An independent research firm 
commissioned by the IRS to survey CAP taxpayers reported in mid-2005 that the IRS’s 
commitment to CAP was strong and most respondents expressed a desire to continue in the 
programme. 
 
The pilot period lasted for six years, after which CAP became a permanent feature of the IRS’s 
compliance operations with effect from 31 March 2011. 
 
Main features of US CAP 
 
As of August 2016, there were 181 taxpayers participating in the permanent CAP programme 
and a critical difference between this and the pilot is that taxpayers have to go through a rather 
rigorous application process before they are allowed access to the programme. Following the 
pilot phase, two additional features were added to CAP: first, a roadmap was published of the 
steps required for gaining entry into CAP; and, second, a new CAP maintenance programme 
intended for businesses participating in CAP that had fewer complex issues and could 
demonstrate a track record of working cooperatively and transparently with the IRS was 
announced. Hence, three stages exist in the programme: Pre-CAP, CAP and Compliance 
Maintenance. 
 
A  taxpayer participating in CAP is expected to work collaboratively with an IRS team to 
identify and resolve potential tax issues before their tax return is filed each year. In this real-
time resolution approach, taxpayers are subject to a shorter post-filing examination period with 
fewer contentious items to be dealt with. As noted in the CAP Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), which is signed by both the IRS and the corporate taxpayer, the objectives of CAP are 
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formulated as: to “achieve federal tax compliance [-], to achieve an acceptable level of 
assurance regarding the accuracy of the Taxpayer’s filed tax return and to eliminate or 
substantially reduce the need for a traditional examination”. Importantly, however, the CAP 
pre-filing review conducted by the IRS does not constitute an examination or inspection of the 
taxpayer’s books of account as part of a routine compliance check.  
 
A core feature of CAP is that it focusses on issue identification and resolution through 
transparent and cooperative interaction between taxpayers and the IRS. CAP requires a 
contemporaneous exchange of information related to the proposed return position of a 
corporate and its completed events and transactions that may affect its federal tax liability. An 
Account Coordinator is appointed to be the point of contact, review prior tax history, and 
identify risks and compliance issues. “Throughout the process, the Account Coordinator and 
IRS Counsel work together to resolve CAP issues and taxpayer concerns” (Nolan, 2006, 30). 
After the first year of the pilot, CAP teams apparently reported an average of eight issues per 
taxpayer. Corporates participating in CAP are ostensibly able to achieve tax certainty sooner 
and with less administrative burden than in the traditional post-filing examination programme, 
allowing them to better manage tax reserves and ensure more precise reporting of earnings on 
financial statements. Whilst there is some overlap between the three main phases of the CAP 
programme in terms of processes and procedures, the following section provides an overview 
of each phase. 
 
The Pre-CAP phase has its own application process and eligibility criteria, including the 
company having assets of $10 million or more and not being under investigation by, or in 
litigation with, the IRS or other federal or state agency that would limit the IRS’s access to 
current corporate tax records.7 A successful Pre-CAP application ends in a signed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the company and the IRS which defines specific 
objectives, sets parameters for the disclosure of information, describes the methods of 
communication, and serves as a statement of the parties’ commitment to good faith 
participation in the Pre-CAP. Both the IRS and the corporate must provide a list of designated 
personnel to act as points of contact for gathering information and resolving questions or issues. 
The MOU outlines the requirements for taxpayer disclosures in the following terms: 
 
The IRS and the Taxpayer will work together to develop an action plan to complete 
all required examinations within an established timeframe. During the Pre-CAP 
phase, the Taxpayer must exhibit the same level of transparency and cooperation 
that is required of taxpayers in the CAP phase. The Taxpayer must identify the 
existence of transactions, its return reporting position, and a description of the steps 
within the transactions that have a material effect on its federal income tax liability. 
Further, the Taxpayer must disclose any other item that has a material effect on its 
federal income tax liability and its return reporting position with regard to those 
items. It must provide relevant information within the established timeframes. The 
Taxpayer disclosures described in this paragraph will be in writing.  
 
In addition to transactions, description of steps within a transaction and other 
material items described above, the Taxpayer will provide the IRS with: the 
industry overview, current legal, accounting and tax organizational charts 
                                                 
7 Examples are the company: having assets of $10 million or more; being a publicly held entity with a legal 
requirement to prepare and submit Forms 10K, 10Q, 8K or 20F or other disclosure type forms to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission; and not being under investigation by, or in litigation with, the IRS or other federal or 
state agency that would limit the IRS’s access to current corporate tax records. 
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reflecting all related entities and the flow of relevant information involving those 
entities, financial performance information, information on any significant events 
that affected reporting for the tax year, access to accounting records and systems, 
and necessary resources for disclosure of requested information.  
 
The Taxpayer will provide information and documentation proactively and as 
requested by the TC [team coordinator]. The TC will promptly review all relevant 
information provided and will communicate to the Taxpayer whether (1) additional 
information is required; (2) the IRS disagrees with the Taxpayer’s tax treatment; 
or (3) the tax treatment is appropriate.  
 
Interestingly, the IRS and taxpayers will jointly determine the scope of the Pre-CAP 
examinations, including materiality thresholds. Materiality thresholds are used as a guide by 
both parties in determining the transactions to review. However, the ultimate decision of 
identifying transactions, items and issues for the Pre-CAP examinations remains within the 
discretion of the IRS. The Pre-CAP phase ends when the taxpayer is eligible for the CAP phase, 
is terminated from the Pre-CAP or decides to discontinue participation in the Pre-CAP.  
 
The CAP phase has the same eligibility requirements as above but additionally, if currently 
under examination, the taxpayer must not have more than one filed return that has not been 
closed in examination and one unfiled return for the year that has most recently ended, the 
return for which is not yet due. Applications for CAP must be completed annually. An annual 
CAP MOU must be signed by both parties. The IRS and taxpayers will work together during 
the CAP stage to identify and review material transactions and issues, and regular meetings are 
standard practice (these could be weekly, monthly or quarterly). At the end of the annual CAP 
phase, and pre-filing of the tax return, the IRS issues the taxpayer with a Full or Partial 
Acceptance Letter depending on the extent of compliance with the MOU and resolution of 
matters raised. In cases where a Full Acceptance Letter is issued, the goal for completing the 
post-filing review of the filed return is within 90 days of the filing of the return, which is a 
prompt completion timeline for a taxpayer. Importantly, the IRS may reduce the level of review 
based on the complexity and number of issues, and the taxpayer’s history of compliance, 
cooperation and transparency in the CAP. Arguably there is reward for “good behaviour” 
within the CAP framework by way of reduced administrative costs and levels of scrutiny. 
Notably there are additional provisions within CAP in the area of transfer pricing, which 
involves significant liaison with the relevant IRS departments. 
 
Upon completion of two full successful CAP cycles, a taxpayer can apply for the CAP 
Maintenance Phase. Companies can apply for the CAP Maintenance Phase annually, together 
with the annual completion of an MOU, and eligibility depends upon the meeting of 
expectations as set out in the annual MOUs. Participation in the Maintenance Phase means a 
lower level of review by the IRS, although disclosure requirements remain unchanged. 
Depending on the complexity of transactions and volume, it is feasible for a taxpayer to move 
back and forth between CAP and CAP Maintenance status, and the annual application process 
facilitates this happening.  
 
The CAP programme has specific provisions governing the termination (by the IRS) or 
withdrawal from any of the above three phases of the programme. The above phases of CAP 
put high demands on IRS resources – not only in terms of the number of staff dedicated to deal 
with CAP cases but also the larger degree of expertise required by IRS staff when interacting 
on a real-time basis with large, mostly complex, businesses. 
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Future trajectory of US CAP 
 
Despite CAP now having been in place for more than ten years, there has been limited 
evaluation of the programme. While the programme is generally considered by the IRS to have 
been successful at first, its extension to a larger number of corporate taxpayers is not feasible 
due to resource constraints (Harvey, 2011). 
 
Notably, one review was conducted in 2013 by the Treasury Inspector General Tax 
Administration (TIGTA), which conducts independent oversight of IRS activities. The review 
concluded that whilst there was some favourable feedback about the programme, additional 
analysis of cost and benefits was needed (TIGTA, 2013). The TIGTA review found out that 
audits under CAP consume substantially more staff hours than those under the traditional audit 
process, with the hourly revenue rate collected under CAP being around a third of the hourly 
rate collected under traditional audits ($2,939 under CAP versus $8,448 under traditional 
supervision). Processes and procedures, however, were observed as being followed adequately. 
Overall, the Treasury Inspector’s review suggests CAP represented a very significant drain on 
IRS resources and charged the IRS’s LB&I Division with delivering an evaluation plan.  The 
IRS agreed to do this. The Treasury Inspector also directed LB&I to consider CAP as an IRS 
user fee source. A user fee can be applied by the IRS to recover the cost of providing certain 
services to the public that confer special benefits to the recipients.  
 
The most significant recent development, however, happened in September 2016, when the 
IRS stopped accepting any new businesses into the programme. This “hold” was announced by 
the IRS in the context of the current comprehensive review which all three phases of the CAP 
programme are undergoing. According to the IRS, the assessment of CAP is required “given 
today’s challenging environment of limited resources and budget constraints, combined with a 
business need to evaluate existing programmes to ensure they are aligned with LB&I’s strategic 
vision”.8 As the review continues, only taxpayers in the current CAP and Compliance 
Maintenance phases may apply for their annual participation in CAP, whilst current Pre-CAP 
taxpayers may remain in the Pre-CAP phase. Current CAP taxpayers may be moved into the 
Compliance Maintenance phase. This review was presumably, at least in part, the IRS’s 
response to the 2013 review by TIGTA. Considering there are fewer than 200 corporates 
participating in CAP, perhaps the IRS does indeed need to refocus resources. For example, 
should more resources be directed to those taxpayers not opting into CAP and who are more 
likely to be non-compliant? However, in response to the IRS’s review announcement, KPMG 
(2016) has stated that CAP exposes the IRS to “extremely useful understanding and visibility 
concerning the current business and economic environment and transactions that are actually 
being conducted within specific industries”. Of course, such unique knowledge and insight 
obtained through CAP can be transferred and therefore enhance IRS performance well beyond 
the CAP programme. 
 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, in September 2018, presumably on the back of the IRS carrying out 
the evaluation of CAP as requested by TIGTA, the IRS issued a discussion document on CAP 
recalibration9, clearly recognising the resource-intensive nature of CAP to date and the need 
for change. Interestingly, it calls for changes to be made by both the IRS and the taxpayers 
involved. Such changes include the need for greater consistency and accountability on both 
                                                 
8 https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/irs-continues-comprehensive-assessment-of-the-cap-program. 
9 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/CAP_Recalibration.pdf. Interestingly, both Ireland and the UK have recently 
also “recalibrated” their respective co-operative compliance models; the former has relaunched co-operative 
compliance and the latter is piloting a new business risk review model.    
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parts, and greater adherence to the requirements of CAP. With no new applicants being 
accepted for 2019, the changes suggest new applicants in 2020 must be publicly held C-
corporations and have certified tax control frameworks in place. Such changes certainly suggest 
operational inefficiencies and potentially some breach of the requirements of CAP on both 
parts heretofore. The suitability of taxpayers for participating in the recalibrated CAP will be 
based on certain taxpayer behaviour and the IRS provides explicit examples of what would not 
constitute such behaviour, e.g. failure to disclose a tax shelter, and not engaging in meaningful 
or good faith issue resolution discussions. This is evidence for trying to ensure the applicants 
most suitable to CAP are actually accepted, so there is an apparent renewed and greater 
emphasis on eligibility. The application process will be more rigorous and include a 
comprehensive Initial Issues List to ensure that there is a greater chance that CAP will succeed 
and ultimately not be more resource-intensive than the normal post-filing examinations of 
similarly sized companies. Timeliness of response by the IRS is a critical dimension of the 
changes required, so a key change will be the introduction of a 90-day target to develop and 
resolve issues; once the return has been filed, the goal is to review it within 60 days. Training 
on this recalibrated CAP is ongoing, and the IRS has committed to ongoing monitoring and is 
open to further changes for improvement of CAP in the future.  
 
Dolan and McCormally (2018) explain the extension of the CAP programme, observing that 
“[t]he costs of CAP are not insignificant. The programme is extremely resource-intensive for 
both taxpayers and the IRS, and the effort required upfront (during Pre-CAP and on an ongoing 
basis) may dissuade some taxpayers from applying for, or remaining in the program” (p.2). 
 
Whatever one sees as the advantages and disadvantages of CAP, it appears that CAP, by virtue 
of rolling out a recalibrated version as outlined above, has become embedded in the 
mechanisms by which the IRS seeks to verify federal income tax returns efficiently. It will be 
interesting to monitor the uptake of this initiative in 2020 and important to see if the eventual 
evaluation concludes it is perceived to be a success for both parties. The following section 
considers the evolution and operation of US CAP to date through the lens of Etienne’s (2013) 
typology of regulator-regulatee relationships. 
 
CAP: MOTIVATIONS AND RELATIONAL SIGNALLING 
 
The following analysis of CAP by reference to Etienne’s typology is informed by two sets of 
empirical data. The first (Study 1) is a series of interviews by one of the present authors, which 
was conducted in the US in 2015. Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with very 
senior in-house tax executives/advisors, covering a range of issues related to tax planning and 
compliance by MNEs. The second set of empirical data is derived from a large project (Study 
2), which involved two of the present authors. As part of a larger country comparative research 
project, five additional interviews were conducted during 2015 and 2016 with tax officials and 
senior in-house tax executives who had either been involved with the implementation of CAP 
or had engaged with the IRS in discussions about joining CAP. While the evaluation of CAP 
was not the exclusive focus of the empirical studies, the CAP-related findings reveal some 
interesting and relevant insights from participants. 
 
Notwithstanding the somewhat uncertain future of CAP in terms of opening up to new 
applicants, it currently remains part of a suite of approaches to relationships between the IRS 
and some large corporate taxpayers. CAP represents a particular form of regulatory 
intervention that goes against the grain of the IRS tradition of adversarial regulation (see, for 
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example, Sakurai (2002)). It appears to be an outlier, the adoption of which may have been 
motivated by simultaneous developments in other countries.  
 
In terms of Etienne’s ideal type motivations, self-interest would appear to be the prime 
motivator for entry into, and continued participation in, the CAP programme. Both sides 
experience potential resource savings, both quantifiable (e.g. timely settlement of outstanding 
disputes) and non-quantifiable (increased certainty). The ability to acquire faster and greater 
certainty whilst being in CAP motivates corporates to make the extra effort that is required 
under CAP in the direction of the tax authority. For the IRS, objectives are more pluriform, but 
the expectation of realising administrative efficiencies has been a prominent one. CAP’s long 
pilot period and slow roll-out show cautiousness on the side of the IRS to implement a 
programme when the costs and benefits of that programme are difficult to evaluate from a tax 
administration perspective. One interviewee said: “It turned out to be extremely personnel 
intensive. [The IRS] just don’t have the people. And it’s a burden on companies too” (Study 2: 
US01).  
 
By viewing the CAP relationship as one primarily of self-interest, we can explain how 
bargaining is a positive relational signal – used to resolve disputes by way of settlement – and 
that claims of authority, particularly by the IRS, may not hold much sway. This is consistent 
with De Simone, Sansing and Seidman’s (2011) depiction of CAP from a game theoretic 
perspective, focussing on the extent of disclosure by the taxpayer to the IRS and finding that, 
theoretically, a cooperative compliance approach can be beneficial even in the absence of 
sanctions for violating agreed upon terms of engagement. Regulatory relief is also a positive 
signal in a self-interest relationship, and is manifested, in the case of CAP, as reduced post-
filing audits.  
 
The CAP relationship is governed by a formal Memorandum of Understanding which brings 
legality into the picture, albeit not as strongly as when a statutory mandate exists. Despite the 
focus of the IRS in CAP on the process by which tax returns are being produced by corporates, 
CAP has not, in formal legal terms, changed how the IRS determines corporate tax compliance. 
With the focus on the accuracy and timeliness of the regulatee’s tax returns, the same criteria 
are applied as were in use prior to the implementation of CAP. The key difference for CAP 
participants is extra-legal benefits in terms of speedier dispute resolution and reduced audit 
scope, which benefit both taxpayers and the IRS. The MOU requires that the parties interact 
on a regular basis and that they will “collectively discuss and provide feedback on the level of 
cooperation and transparency from each Parties perspective”. 
 
Beck and Lisowsky (2012) find that CAP participants report larger uncertain tax benefits in 
their financial statements before entering the programme than non-participants and that 
participants subsequently experience a reduced magnitude of reported uncertain tax benefit. 
Formalism is a relational signal with positive connotations in a legality relationship; in the case 
of CAP, this is represented by the signing of the MOU. Indeed, formalism can serve to protect 
the regulatee from IRS capriciousness. As the focus of a legality relationship is the law per se, 
signals such as regulatory relief, favours and threats are negative signals. Monitoring serves as 
a reminder of hierarchy and is expected, and therefore viewed positively, in legality 
relationships. 
 
Authority appears to be of less importance in this particular instance of co-operative 
compliance. The adversarial undertones of interactions between large corporate taxpayers and 
the IRS have been described as “cat and mouse”, with neither side respecting the other’s 
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authority, and it is not entirely clear that those participating in CAP are different in this regard 
to those who are not participating. One Study 1 interviewee showed a lack of confidence in the 
IRS’s ability to deliver on certainty –  i.e. a lack of respect for the regulator’s authority – stating: 
“We can’t not do something for months while [the IRS] thinks about it” (Study 1: US01).  
 
Monitoring is viewed as a positive signal in an authority relationship and where regulatees 
acknowledge the authority of the IRS, accelerated monitoring in the form of real-time 
disclosures will be more likely to be tolerated.  
 
Judgement is important in the sense that reaching agreement on current and past disputed issues 
requires a level of compromise from both sides. Reflecting on the introduction of CAP, one of 
our interviewees said: “When it first started out, it took a long time for each of the two sides to 
figure out exactly how to deal with each other. In other words, from the company’s side, ‘How 
much do I tell these people? What do I do?’ And from the IRS side, it was more, ‘Am I allowed 
to ask them for things?”’ (Study 2: US01).  A Study 1 participant, when asked “would you 
participate in it?”, said “No… there’s an agent sitting there. I’ve got to tell him all the details, 
run everything through and go over the whole thing, my position, how I arrived at that, the 
whole works, forget it, I’ll do it on audit” (Study 1: US02). 
 
In judgement relationships, the use of third-party intervention, such as expert advice, can be 
viewed positively in recognition, for example, of a need for additional technical expertise. 
Threats, sanctions and monitoring, on the other hand, are perceived as negative signals, 
undermining the mutual respect arising from the exercise of judgement in what is a highly 
complex technical environment.  
 
Finally, with respect to solidarity, trust is an essential element of the underlying ethos of any 
co-operative compliance arrangement. Given that new entrants to CAP were those taxpayers 
with good records of compliance who were willing to be transparent, solidarity in the form of  
mutual trust that the relationship will benefit both parties is clearly important. Trust includes a 
measure of acceptance of the difficulties faced by the other party in the relationship. One 
corporate interviewee  commented on the resource constraints faced by the IRS, stating: “These 
are great programmes in theory but the execution on the ground just isn’t happening. The IRS… 
are not getting the resources they need to effectively execute these programmes” (Study 1: 
US03). One of the interviewees in Study 2 had chosen not to participate in CAP and observed: 
“We’ve had some discussions with others that have signed up to the CAP programme, and 
they’ve generally found it positive, so we’ve always kept thinking about it… But overall, I 
suppose, we’ve not seen the benefit of doing it” (Study 2, UK25). In solidarity relationships, 
threats and sanctions are perceived as negative relational signals. This may explain why, as 
reported in De Simone et al. (2013), although the IRS has identified firms that are not 
transparent, no taxpayer has been asked to leave the programme.  
 
In summary, and as predicted by Etienne (2013), categorisation of a live responsive regulation 
programme (here, CAP) into a single ideal type of motivational position is not possible and is 
almost certainly not desirable. A complex mix of motivations can be seen, and once relational 
signals are brought into the picture, the purity of the typology is muddied. The point, however, 
is not to try to demonstrate a goodness of fit between CAP and Etienne’s typology, but rather 
to use the typology to interrogate the practical features of CAP and illustrate the need for 
sensitivity to this, more nuanced, picture of regulator-regulatee relationships in designing new 
policy interventions.  
 





The application of Etienne’s (2013) framework in this article demonstrates that interactions 
between regulators and regulatees follow multiple relationship logics. Although motivations 
are plural, they do not carry equal weight nor have they remained stable over time.  
 
Twenty-five years after the publication of Ayres and Braithwaite’s “Responsive Regulation” 
(1992), responsive-based regulatory systems have further expanded and more empirical 
information has become available about their performance. In tax administration, responsive 
regulation is prominent in the area of corporate taxation, with several countries significantly 
restructuring interactions between the tax administration and corporate taxpayers in line with 
its principles.  
 
CAP, when analysed drawing on Etienne’s model, shows the importance of adequately 
capturing the motivations of regulator and regulatee, and illuminates the unlikeliness that their 
interests will synchronise. This can make the successful introduction of initiatives like CAP 
problematic. 
 
It can be expected that an adequate implementation of a responsive regulatory tax system 
requires more, rather than less, administrative capacity from the regulator and regulatee, at least 
during the initial period – an upfront investment of time and resources. To reduce 
administrative costs on both sides, it is crucial that both the regulator and regulatee develop 
systems enabling them to deal effectively and efficiently with the high degree of interaction 
that takes place within responsive regulation-based arrangements. This high level of interaction 
will occur, in particular, during the initial stage of responsive regulation-based relationships, 
when a relatively large number of regulatees is likely to be found at the lower end of the 
regulatory pyramid in the compliant category and hence only need more feedback to improve 
their level of fiscal control. Ayres (2013) supports Etienne (2013) in her contention that there 
is inherent ambiguity in how regulatory signals will be received, but also notes that “theory can 
only go so far in resolving the ambiguities and in predicting their likely interpretation” (p.149).  
 
Obviously, there is no universal responsive regulatory model and specific choices underlie the 
design of CAP.  Despite its specific features, CAP demonstrates many similarities to responsive 
regulation, such as the emphasis on one-to-one relationships between regulator and regulatees. 
The CAP case shows that this emphasis is both a strength and weakness of the model: it enables 
flexibility and relationships based on professionalism, but it also demands a high administrative 
capacity and potentially causes risk of regulatory capture in the event that Account Managers 
(in the tax administration) become too close to their respective taxpayer regulatees.  
 
A promising way by which to circumvent some of these weaknesses is to improve aggregate 
data systems about regulatees, which may help regulators to validate their discretionary 
decision-making using big data. It would also enable regulators to provide more and better 
feedback to regulatees, focussing both on features that increase and features that reduce a 
regulatee’s risk of non-compliance. In addition, albeit not addressed here specifically, clearly 
there is an important role for scholars to play in terms of analysing how recent technological 
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